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ITS PLACE IN THE HISTORICAL COST 
LITERATURE AND CONJECTURE ABOUT 
ITS DISAPPEARANCE 
Abstract: How best to provide management with useful information 
about the underutilization of factory and machinery are old cost ac-
counting questions. The literature from the turn of the century up 
through the 1950s reveals that the topic interested many. This paper 
resurrects those historical discussions. The objective is twofold, to 
demonstrate the sophistication and innovation of early writers em-
phasizing why they thought the topic important, and, to explore some 
theories about why this interest dissipated within the accounting 
literature. The possibilities include the effect of the great depression, 
wartime regulations, the withdrawal of the industrial engineer from 
costing and the growing importance of income measurement. This 
research ends in the 1960s, by which time idle capacity as an inde-
pendent topic has largely disappeared. 
Accounting for and providing management with informa-
tion about idle time and idle capacity1 was a subject that occu-
pied cost accountants primarily in the first half of this century. 
Garner's (1976) review of the literature from 1900 to 1925 
showed that the topic appeared frequently and regularly. The 
economist, J.M. Clark, thought understanding and controlling 
capacity to be of such importance that he made it the central 
theme of his landmark 1923 book, The Economics of Overhead 
Costs. While some of Clark's topics, such as his exploration of 
differential analysis, remains in modern texts, his particular in-
terest in the isolation and interpretation of idle capacity disap-
peared. Many authors of cost textbooks before 1950 gave sub-
stantial space to the problem of idle capacity, but its coverage 
declined and it has only been in recent years that capacity issues 
have reappeared in the cost literature. 
1The subject of idle time includes the idle time of labor, the idle time of 
specific machines and the idle time of the factory, more commonly called idle 
capacity. In the literature and in this paper, the terms are used interchangeably. 
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Of the idle time of labor, of machinery and of the factory, 
the latter two dominate the literature. Writers in the cost litera-
ture from 1900 to 1960 seldom address the topic of idle labor. 
Garner's (1976) work shows only the technical, that is, the book-
keeping, aspect of labor accounting. There are no later articles 
illustrating how accounting measurements might be used to 
provide information for management control purposes (ex-
amples of the technical type include: Brown 1927, Peden 1934, 
Totten 1941).2 Managers undoubtedly observed and controlled 
labor outside of or tangentially to the accounting system. The 
consistency with which the literature treats labor as a pure vari-
able cost3 suggests that it was either easily managed or was 
subject to other controls.4 For these reasons, labor issues will 
not be covered here. 
This paper resurrects historical discussions of idle capacity. 
The objective is twofold, first to demonstrate the sophistication 
and innovation of early writers emphasizing why they thought 
the topic important, and second to explore some theories about 
why this interest dissipated within the accounting literature. 
This research ends in the 1960s, by which time idle capacity as 
an independent topic has largely disappeared. 
This paper is divided into five sections. The first describes 
broadly why idle capacity was important to early cost accoun-
tants and, briefly, why it lost its importance. The second reviews 
a variety of writings on the subject from 1900 through 1960. The 
third presents evidence of the disappearance of the subject from 
the literature. The fourth examines reasons why the subject dis-
appeared. The fifth is the conclusion. 
2Labor variances are found throughout the literature. However, these pre-
sentations are not accompanied by lengthy discussions about the importance of 
the issue beyond the technical aspects of accounting. 
3A few writers suggest situations where some labor costs might be recorded 
as fixed rather than variable (Alden 1924). One instance would be when highly 
skilled workers are retained despite lack of work in order to preserve their skills 
for the firm. The other possibility is to record as fixed, the wages of the mini-
m u m personnel needed to operate. 
4The few references to idle labor in the cost literature treat it casually by 
remarking that "labor can be discharged or put on fewer hours when output 
declines" (Dohr, Inghram and Love 1935). Fiske (1931, 355) said that "losses 
arising from idle labor are less significant than those arising from idle plant 
since in most cases labor costs are at least partially controllable through layoff." 
2
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 23 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol23/iss1/3
Vollmers: Accounting for Idle Capacity 27 
INTRODUCTION 
The cost literature contains many references to and articles 
about factory and machine capacity through the 1950s. While 
overhead in general was always the literature's dominant topic, 
the particular interest in idle capacity was a consequence of 
substantial investments in plant and machinery and the influ-
ence of the industrial engineer. The early decades of the century 
were ones in which the engineer and the cost accountant fo-
cused on the productive or operational efficiency of the plant. 
The beginning of the century witnessed an explosion of 
machinery in manufacturing and a fascination on the part of 
society as a whole with science, efficiency and standardization 
(Chase, 1929a & b; Boorstin, 1973). Accompanying the heavy 
capital investments in plant and machinery was a rise in mass 
production techniques best symbolized by Henry Ford's auto-
motive operations (Garner, 1976).5 
Mass production was both a result of the capabilities of 
machines and a reaction to them. "The large investment in the 
machinery and equipment of an industrial plant necessitates 
getting the utmost use out of this equipment. Proper planning 
. . . and regulation . . . constitute one of the greatest problems in 
industrial management" (Jordan and Harris, 1920, p. 402). "Af-
ter all, the measurement of a business is not its capitalization or 
the magnitude of its physical equipment, but the net return on 
the capital employed" (Peden, 1924, p. 121). Large capital 
investments seemed to mandate mass production and a drive to 
make that production efficient. 
To meet the needs of this newly developing industrial soci-
ety, a new kind of engineer evolved. Mechanical engineers began 
to discuss efficiency at the end of the 19th century — how to 
measure it and how to increase it. Interested in the efficiency of 
the production process and the maximization of the output of 
both people and machines, these engineers were the genesis of 
what was later called the Scientific Management movement.6 
5See particularly extensive quotes by Alfred Sloan regarding the necessity of 
mass production at Ford Motor and Hyatt Roller Bearing Company in Garner 
(1976,210-212) 
6The term, Scientific Management, was coined by Louis Brandeis who popu-
larized it when he testified in 1910 against the request for rate increases by the 
eastern railroads in front of the Interstate Commerce Commission. He claimed 
(having read Frederick Taylor's works) that the railroads were poorly managed 
and that if they were more scientifically managed they would profit more than 
by increasing their rates (Boorstin 1974). 
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Their descendants are today's industrial engineers. Their inter-
est in efficient production processes linked up early with cost 
accounting. It is from their work that time studies, standard-
ization and wage incentive plans derived—all methods employed 
to increase efficiency. Many of them contributed heavily to the 
cost literature. 
The depressions of 1920-1921 and the 1930s brought into 
stark relief the devastation of deep undercapacity usage. Factory 
and machinery were large investments that could not be laid off 
or ignored. Under these conditions, thoughtful accountants and 
engineers warned that failure to understand and communicate 
the implications of undercapacity usage would lead to dysfunc-
tional decisions. 
In a period of declining output the manufacturer is like-
ly to conclude that selling prices must be increased in 
order to cover the increased costs whereas an increase 
in selling prices leads only to further decline in demand 
and in output (Dohr et al., 422, p. 1935). 
In later decades, although references to capacity and effi-
ciency issues appear periodically in the literature, there was a 
clear decline. One reason for this was a shift in emphasis from 
the production function to the sales function. It became more 
important to anticipate sales and plan production to meet sales 
requirements than it was to measure whether machinery was 
producing as efficiently as possible. Identifying the reasons for 
this shift is one of the purposes of this work. Major upheavals in 
the economy, the great depression and World War II, certainly 
contributed. Another appears to have been the emergence of 
income measurement , dominated by financial accounting's 
matching principle. The matching principle helped to move the 
definition of efficiency away from the capacity of factory and 
machine to how closely production could be tied to sales. The 
cost accounting system was no longer used to identify the 
underutilization of facilities. 
ACCOUNTING FOR IDLE TIME 
Operational Efficiency 
Early in the century, Alexander H. Church (1901), an engi-
neer, published a series of articles describing a method of ac-
counting for factory overhead costs. His influential but contro-
versial ideas included isolating the cost of idle machinery. 
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Although others also tackled the idle time problem, his work is 
particularly memorable. His contemporaries cited, argued about 
and praised his prolific writings for three decades and his work 
is still remembered.7 
Critical of the common practice of applying overhead using 
a single, factory-wide rate, he insisted that multiple rates were 
needed in order to generate useful information. He proposed 
that the factory be divided into 'tiny shops'—small work areas or 
work benches—departments usually composed of a single ma-
chine operated by one man. Overhead costs were to be carefully 
apportioned among these tiny shops and then applied to prod-
ucts using a machine hour rate calculated for each individual 
shop. 
In the denominator of the application rate was the normal 
number of hours the machine should be used. 'Normal' hours 
were those during which the machine could operate less an al-
lowance for usual downtime such as repairs. If the machine 
were idle, the overhead for those hours would be entered into an 
idle time account. Church (1901) said that the sum of the dollars 
spent to maintain capacity was analogous to water dripping— 
dripping from as many faucets as there were tiny shops. Either 
the water dripped into a job or it dripped into a pool of waste. 
Fixed costs, already sunk into the factory, could only be recov-
ered through useful production. Idle time, therefore, was money 
lost and its segregation would show management just how 
expensive operational inefficiency was. 
Church was not alone in his concerns. Gantt (1917, 370), 
another engineer, wrote tha t "the expense of main ta in ing 
machinery in idleness is far greater than most people realize . . . 
and all who wish to operate efficiently will begin at once to see 
how it may be minimized." Harrison (1919, 443), a cost accoun-
tant, in a critique of contemporary cost accounting wrote: 
Cost systems do not show the cost of non-production 
but ingeniously saddle the machine which works with 
the cost of the machine which is idle . . . (T)he merging 
of the cost of idleness with the cost of production abso-
lutely kills the value of cost statements considered as 
indices of operating efficiency. 
7Richard Vangermeersch's work on Alexander Church, engineer and accoun-
tant, is important to those interested in the development of cost accounting in 
the first third of this century—see bibliography. 
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He predicted that engineers would take over cost account-
ing unless cost accountants improved their information produc-
ing capabilities. Engineers and accountants in the literature 
agreed that managing facilities in order to maximize the produc-
tive output of machines was of prime importance. The question 
was how the cost system could highlight areas of inefficiency. 
Although the answer did not always come exclusively from for-
mal accounting records, the primary source of information was 
over- or underapplied overhead as measured in each depart-
ment. However, this measured efficiency only if the denomina-
tor volume of the overhead rate calculation was carefully calcu-
lated. 
Normal Capacity 
To separate productive hours from idle hours most authors, 
including Church (1901) and Jordan and Harris (1920), used 
'normal capacity.'8 The term itself, 'normal capacity,' was not 
applied universally so a reader must read texts closely to discov-
er how each author defined the denominator volume. Neverthe-
less, most described a production-linked denominator which 
was commonly called 'normal capacity.' Normal capacity was 
the number of hours machinery should be operating (usually 
reduced by an allowance for average downtime). It was to re-
main stable over a period of years so that costs could be mean-
ingfully compared over time. (Normal could also be applied to 
labor hours if machine rates were not used.) 
The 1921 NACA-Yearbook contains the papers and discus-
sions of a conference devoted largely to the subject of overhead 
distribution under abnormal conditions (the 1920-21 depres-
sion). The participants discussed terminology at some length. 
What is a normal overhead rate? Is a rate which during 
a period of normal production and normal expense will 
absorb all the overhead expense of that period...The 
most difficult thing to determine will be the normal 
volume of production. Normal production does not 
mean possible production (Williams, 1921, p. 203). 
8The literature implies that most companies did want to use a predeter-
mined overhead rate as opposed to waiting until the end of the year to gather 
actual overhead costs and apply them at that point. No doubt some companies 
did wait for actual costs but the literature reflects a clear preference for antici-
pated costs. 
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One essential element has been neglected in developing 
this normal rate . . . In predetermining a burden or ex-
pense rate to be applied to costs, a sufficient period 
should be reviewed to include a cycle of both good and 
bad business years (Merrifield, 1921, p. 212) 
Using normal capacity to allocate overhead would produce 
idle time losses if machinery were underutilized. It could also 
generate an over-capacity gain but such an occurrence was 
rarely considered in the literature. Clapp (1921, p. 223) said that 
a cost system that did not measure idle time failed to provide 
critical information about the efficiency of production. Normal 
rates were needed to "to supply information to the executive 
department to enable it to gauge the operations of the factory." 
The participants finally voted on a definition. 
'Normal capacity basis' is the total possible time (that 
means any kind of work, machine or other), less rea-
sonable allowance for break-downs, repairs, ineffi-
ciency, reasonable lack of operators, and all other regu-
lar normal delays outside of lack of orders to run on 
(NACA-Yearbook, 1921, p. 241). 
The definition was based on productive output.9 Anticipated 
sales volume did not enter into overhead rate because managing 
the equipment in order to coax as much production out of it as 
possible had nothing to do with the availability of or lack of 
sales. Most important, since overhead costs were applied at the 
departmental level, productive inefficiencies could be identified 
at a micro level. 
The definition of what constituted a 'department' in the cost 
literature was unique. Briefly, a department was a machine or 
group of similar machines that produced a single product (or 
similar group of products) under the supervision of a single 
manager (Lawrence, 1925, p. 24-25; Dohr, Inghram and Love, 
1935, p. 66; Blocker, 1950, p. 22). The numerator of the over-
head rate was calculated for each department. Direct overhead 
costs (e.g. departmental depreciation) were included as well as 
joint overhead costs that had been allocated using a base that 
had, if possible, a causal relationship to the costs (e.g. janitorial 
costs based on square footage). Dividing this total by normal 
9Of the 11 people contributing articles or entering into the discussion, none 
were academics—all were employed by companies as either accountants or engi-
neers. 
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capacity for the individual department produced a departmental 
overhead rate. This permitted managers to observe the propor-
tional demands on elements of overhead of different depart-
ments and product lines. In none of the texts or articles used for 
this paper did any author recommend factory-wide overhead 
application rates. 
With unearned burden (idle time) eliminated, the unit 
cost of lots produced may be fairly compared from one 
period to another, and made the basis for a satisfactory 
measure of the operating efficiency of the department. 
These costs may also be compared with the standards 
of efficiency which have been established, thereby giv-
ing a true conception of the value of the results ob-
tained, regardless of any variation in the volume of 
production. The actual expenses are compared with the 
budget, and the actual production or operating time 
compared with the standard, thus giving us two very 
effective checks on the efficiency of each department 
(Crockett, 1921, p. 218-219). 
It is very significant that the definition of normal capacity 
excluded sales. This productive or operational efficiency view of 
costing emphasized the manufacturing function over the sales 
or marketing function of a business. It was not until the 1930s 
that one finds denominator volumes based on budgeted sales in 
the cost literature. It was the change in the denominator volume 
that signaled a movement away from measurement of produc-
tive efficiency. 
Idle Time And Product Cost 
Productive efficiency was not the only reason for tracking 
idle t ime—determining product costs was another. Church 
(1901) said that since the factory existed to produce goods, all 
costs were product costs. The idle time charges generated by his 
me thod were real located over p roduc t ion by means of a 
supplementary rate. This would allow management to see, on a 
full cost basis, how much each good actually cost (Vanger-
meersch, 1986; Garner, 1976). This aspect of his method was 
controversial because it resulted in dramatic changes in per unit 
cost under volatile business conditions. Few viewed an idle time 
loss as a product cost. Church (1930) later abandoned the 
supplementary rate and instead adopted, as did the majority of 
other authors, the practice of expensing the idle time account as 
a line item to profit and loss. 
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Jordan and Harris (1920) joined many writers concerned by 
the effect on per unit cost of changes in factory capacity and in 
the volume of production.10 Production volume has a large effect 
on per unit total cost if the fixed overhead rate is calculated 
based on different yearly volume estimates or if the idle time of 
a particular year is redistributed back over that year's produc-
tion. In periods of high production, costs appear to decrease and 
in periods of low production, costs appear to increase. 
Concerned that these variations could be misunderstood 
and lead to dysfunctional managerial choices, Jordan and Harris 
(1920) and Clapp (1921) wanted to distinguish between idleness 
due to manageable problems and those due to economic condi-
tions. The use of a normal capacity denominator was the means 
to this end. It stabilized the fixed overhead portion of product 
cost over a period of years so that the unmanageable variations 
in the economy were smoothed out and allowed managers to 
make meaningful comparisons of costs from period to period. 
According to Williams (1921, 210), the advantages of using 
a normal rate included the ease with which management could 
assign selling prices, calculate total cost per unit and avoid bur-
dening month ly inventor ies wi th excessive overhead. He 
doubted that managers could wisely interpret data that had not 
been calculated using a normal rate: 
The advantages of using a constant, normal, or average 
overhead are largely psychological. (It) . . . does not 
make costs lower, sell goods more quickly, or miracu-
lously start factories working again. Such a policy, how-
ever, does permit the management to go ahead and fig-
ure their list prices and future profits without the 
upsetting factor of this excessively high overhead star-
ing them in the face in such a way as to disturb their 
equilibrium and cause their reasoning faculties to be-
come warped, because of the apparently panicky or im-
possible conditions confronting them (Williams, 1921, 
p. 208). 
Dohr et al. (1935) agreed with Williams (1921). Unit costs 
inflated by idle time losses in times of low volume production 
encouraged managers to raise prices—the worst possible policy 
in periods of depression. Dohr et al. (1935) preferred to expense 
underabsorbed overhead charges as idle capacity losses and 
10See Garner (1976) for a comprehensive discussion of early approaches to 
idle time problems, from the end of the 19th century until 1925. 
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overabsorbed charges as gains on intensive use. They viewed as 
an abuse the practice of taking under- or overabsorbed overhead 
amounts to a reserve account to smooth out profits. 
Idle Time and Pricing 
Although a cornerstone of classical economic theory is that 
prices are determined by supply and demand, there are numer-
ous references in the cost literature to the practice of setting 
prices based on cost or, at a minimum, using cost information 
as an input into the pricing decision (Williams, 1921; Clark, 
1923; Lawrence, 1945; Clark, 1965 (1947 reprint); Devine, 1950; 
Rushton, 1954). A 1963 NAA Research Report (#39) reported 
that firms relied heavily on product costs for pricing purposes.11 
Many claimed that managers often based prices on the total unit 
cost of a product (Jordan and Harris, 1920; Randleman, 1956). 
Just recently I learned of a large producer of malleable 
castings who quoted on an order for castings and who, 
when told that his price was too high, explained that he 
could make them at a lower price under normal condi-
tions, but that at present his foundry was operating to 
only 30% of capacity and therefore he must obtain a 
higher price in order to avoid loss. He went so far as to 
refuse the order at a price which he admitted would be 
satisfactory if he were operating at normal capacity 
(Williams, 1921, p. 201). 
(Cost accounting) . . . offers great possibilities in the 
way of developing a standard of sound or conservative 
practice in fixing prices, which will act as a check on 
cutthroat competition . . . And of course the critical 
point is, after all, what the management does with the 
figures after it gets them; what use it makes of them in 
the actual fixing of prices (Clark, 1923, p. 14). 
By using normal volume . . . we enable industry to 
establish and maintain a sound price structure. This 
will tend to eliminate cutthroat and ignorant competi-
tion . . . Normal burden rates should not include any 
expense of inefficient operation of any nature, includ-
ing equipment not required for the business. Otherwise, 
such inefficiency may gradually force quotations be-
yond market possibilities (Downie, 1944, p. 7-8). 
11There is a substantial bibliography of articles on cost accounting and its 
relationship to pricing decisions in this NAA study and in #24, "Product Costs 
for Pricing Purposes" (August 1953). 
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The value of a cost structure based on a measure of normal 
capacity included keeping management attuned to a long-term 
vision. This vision would encourage a reasonable approach to 
product pricing. Prices over the long run had to cover all costs, 
but there was general agreement that allowing prices to follow 
short-term cost fluctuations was not only dangerous for the indi-
vidual business but for whole industries as well. 
Accounting For Idle Time—Two Presentations 
Alden (1924, p. 115) illustrated how idle time was measured 
and how those measurements were used in his company. Nor-
mal capacity was approximated at 80% of the possible produc-
tion of individual, but related, machine groups. Each month 
productive hours were gathered from job tickets. Some slack 
time was added to cover repairs and waiting for tools and sup-
plies. The percentage of productive hours to normal hours was 
called the measure of degree of operation. The difference be-
tween the degree of operation and normal was the percentage of 
idleness. The percentage of idleness was then applied to each 
overhead item for each machine group and the sum of all of 
these calculations was idle expense. For service departments, the 
degree of idleness was figured on the basis of the factory as a 
whole. The expenses of the service departments were allocated 
to productive departments only after the idleness portion had 
been subtracted and expensed. 
Alden (1924, p. 120) explained that this procedure isolated 
idle time losses at the departmental level. Foremen could see 
where inefficiencies existed, how much they cost and received 
feedback on the measures taken in the past to increase efficien-
cy. Additionally, because idle time charges were not included, 
inventory values were conservatively stated. This simplified the 
preparation of federal tax returns. The tax code required that 
inventories be stated in accordance with the best accounting 
practice and Alden (1924) and Cornell (1930) agreed that 
conservative valuations were representative of the best practice. 
Additionally, creditors, who relied on inventory figures for their 
lending decisions, benefitted from these lower valuations. 
Fiske's (1931) analysis of idle time was comprehensive and 
detailed. He divided its causes into three separate areas: produc-
tive, administrative and economic. Productive causes included 
breakdowns and powerdowns. Administrative causes included 
building a factory larger than needed and retaining highly 
skilled workers when not needed in order not to lose them. 
11
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Economic causes included seasonal businesses, cyclical business 
cycles and broad changes in demand that created conditions of 
over- or under-capacity. He believed that management made 
poor decisions when they were not aware of the varied causes of 
idle time losses which were usually aggregated into a single 
number. 
The ultimate purpose of all accounting is to provide 
management with the necessary facts upon which ac-
tion may be taken to increase profits by decreasing ex-
pense, and to provide management with the basis for 
evaluating the results produced by the various depart-
ment heads . . . If management were interested in total 
costs alone, there would be no need of keeping records 
of cost of idle time since it could be included by neglect, 
but if the management is interested in information as a 
basis for control, it is necessary to accumulate informa-
tion regarding the cost of idle time (Fiske 1931, p. 360-
1). 
Fiske (1931) suggested that idle time losses caused by nor-
mal seasonal idleness be charged to the product while those 
attributable to excess capacity arising from equipment pur-
chased for future use be currently expensed. As for other causes 
of idle time, he was not concerned with technical accounting per 
se, but with using accounting to illuminate the sources and 
causes of idleness. He recommended keeping statistical records 
separate from the ledger to track the various causes of idle time 
losses and to assess responsibility where possible. 
Idle Time and Supplementary Records 
Brummet (1957, p. 11) criticized the early advocates of 
tracking idle time from 1890-1930 for believing that one cost 
measurement would suffice for all purposes. However, there is 
evidence that at least some writers during that period recog-
nized that supplementary information was needed. 
Jordan and Harris (1920), in their cost textbook, reported 
that managers failed to get the most out of their equipment 
because information about problems was not timely.12 They sug-
gested that multicolored cards representing the status of each 
piece of equipment be placed on a dispatch board to flag those 
12An entire chapter of their book is devoted to the problem of idle machin-
ery. 
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responsible for keeping the machines running.13 Feedback was 
important so cumulative reports should be kept for each ma-
chine showing productive and nonproductive hours and the rea-
sons why the machines had been idle. "This report reflects every 
week the running conditions of the equipment and shows up 
both successes and failures of the effort to eliminate idle time of 
equipment" (417). 
Sanders (1923, p. 17) said that the cost department should 
produce a variety of useful data. Some " . . . control records need 
to be expressed in terms of money, and incorporated in the 
accounting system . . . (other needs) . . . may be adequately 
served by keeping only quantitative statistics, such as quantity 
of materials used, amount of time taken on operations, quantity 
of goods produced and the like." 
Randleman (1956) also recognized the necessity of supple-
mentary information. He discussed the differential information 
arising from the use of alternate definitions of normal capacity. 
One, average capacity, was based on expected future sales over a 
period of years. The other, practical capacity, was the volume at 
which the plant was equipped to operate or the maximum 
capacity attainable (the later has often been called 'theoretical 
capacity').14 Each had advantages and disadvantages. Average 
capacity produced higher unit costs and hid idle capacity losses 
but was preferred for long-term pricing decisions. Practical ca-
pacity highlighted idle capacity, providing information for con-
trol purposes, but was misleading for pricing decisions. 
Randleman (1956) said that no single method of assigning 
costs to inventory could fulfil all needs—additional statistical 
records were necessary. These records would include: estimates 
of average commercial demand, factory capacity that will re-
main unused in meeting average commercial demand, expected 
long-term product costs, a long-range predetermined price set-
ting policy, schedules of production levels and employment lev-
els. All of these cost records would provide realistic short-term 
product costs, reveal the inefficient use of facilities through the 
analysis of unabsorbed burden, and state inventories and profits 
at conservative levels. Vance's (1958) textbook also recom-
13The primary causes of idleness were: no operator, no material, no orders, 
machine breakdown or under repair, no power, waiting for set-up, waiting for 
tools and waiting for instructions (Jordan and Harris 1920, 406). 
14Note that when Randleman (1956) calls the 'volume at which the plant was 
equipped to operate,' 'practical capacity,' the use of that term is similar to the 
earlier usage of the term normal capacity.' 
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mended that statistical records be kept to illuminate idle ma-
chinery. 
Churchill (1958) echoed Randleman (1956). Management 
needed a variety of information to meet different decision needs. 
He did not recommend any single method of accounting be-
cause the choice of denominator volume and whether idle ca-
pacity costs were charged to inventory or to the period was not 
as important as understanding and analyzing the information 
embodied in the costs. "Data in which too much has been 
merged will be meaningless . . . the proper determination of the 
costs attributable to idle capacity is important" (Churchill, 1958, 
p. 87). 
From the beginning of the century, until approximately 
1960, there was a strong interest in operational efficiency, and 
in how cost accounting, by highlighting facilities usage, could 
contribute to these efficiencies. Many recognized that account-
ing methods could lead to dysfunctional decisions. At the same 
time, some practitioners and academics warned that the use of 
any single measure was insufficient for management needs. 
IDLE CAPACITY MEASUREMENT BEGINS TO DISSIPATE 
New ideas in cost and financial accounting were developing 
in parallel with these older notions of operational efficiency and 
were soon to come to prominence. Idle capacity measurement, a 
function of engineering or productive efficiency, began to disap-
pear when financial accounting began to measure sales or mar-
keting efficiency. This is not meant to be an absolute statement. 
Interest in capacity never completely disappeared and much of 
the modern cost literature, including The Goal (Goldratt and 
Cox, 1984) and The Profit Potential (McNair, 1994) explore ca-
pacity issues in detail. However, the 1963 NAA Research Study 
#39 showed that while capacity continued to interest the NAA, 
few of the surveyed firms at that time tracked idle capacity in 
their books. Formal measurement of idle capacity had largely 
disappeared. In its place were measures of sales or selling capac-
ity and income measurement. 
Earlier, a NACA research study (Bulletin, 4/1/38, p. 925) sur-
veyed the overhead practices of its members. The definition of 
'normal' had already changed since the 1921 vote. 'Normal ca-
pacity' in this 1938 study usually meant (bearing in mind that 
the study found much variety in terminology) "the expected uti-
lization of the plant over a period of years in the future, taking 
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into consideration both expected sales for the period and the 
capacity available." Of 194 firms that reported using normal 
capacity, only 39 based it solely on the ability to produce while 
138 considered both the ability to produce and sell. 
This survey marks a major break in the presentation of ca-
pacity themes in the literature. There had been movement away 
from an engineering-oriented view of 'normal' toward a market-
ing or sales-orientation. The implications of this shift are pro-
found. If budgeted production based on expected sales volume is 
used in the denominator of the overhead rate, then the volume 
variance does not measure operational efficiency. It measures 
whether production did or did not exceed a budget and not the 
extent to which machines and factory were productive. 
Of the 224 firms surveyed, 69 isolated fixed charges on idle 
plant and equipment from overhead and 55 of those charged 
that amount to profit and loss. That is to say, fixed charges on 
completely idle assets were not added into the overhead rate 
calculation. It was implied that partial idleness was not consid-
ered. Of the 90 companies that did accumulate idle charges aris-
ing from underused capacity, only 26 of them expensed them as 
a line item—the remainder charged them back to cost of goods 
sold—precisely the choice that earlier writers had condemned as 
misleading. 
DeCoster (1966) recognized this change in orientation. He 
argued that contemporary accounting literature was confused 
about idle capacity losses saying that most authors of articles 
and texts mistook the variance generated by the difference be-
tween actual and expected sales as a measurement of productive 
efficiency. That is, while the terminology of productive efficien-
cy, that of idle capacity, had survived, the computed variance 
was not measuring it. 
Evidence supporting DeCoster's (1966) observation can be 
found in two articles by Horngren (1967, 1969). He analyzed the 
capacity variance that was then commonly computed. The vari-
ance, expected idle capacity, was calculated as the difference 
between possible production and estimated sales. Other vari-
ances included in the articles included: budgeted sales less ac-
tual sales, budgeted sales less sales orders received and sales 
orders received less actual sales. The older measurement of idle 
capacity—the difference between normal and actual produc-
tion—never appeared. In fact, his definition of 'normal' was "the 
rate of activity needed to meet average sales demand over a 
period long enough to encompass seasonal and cyclical fluctua-
15
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tions" (255). Horngren (1967, p. 260) maintained that infor-
mation about idle facilities was needed "at the master budget 
planning stage, not the evaluation of performance stage." He 
ignored the informational value of interim capacity changes. 
None of his variances provided information about capacity op-
portunities. Analysis of capacity, an operational measure, bowed 
to sales measures. 
The final evidence that change occurred lies in modern cost 
textbooks. The majority of these texts use annual budgeted 
p roduc t ion genera ted from annua l expected sales in the 
denominator of the overhead rate calculation (Usry and Ham-
mer, 1991; Barfield, Raiborn and Kinney, 1994). "Under a nor-
mal cost system . . . The rate is developed by predicting total 
overhead costs for the coming year and dividing them by the 
predicted total activity for the coming year" (Morse and Roth, 
1986, p. 69) The same definition appears in Moriarty and Allen 
(1991, p. 581) and in Horngren, Foster and Datar (1994, p. 537). 
While many of these books touch on alternative capacity mea-
sures and spend a page or two on capacity problems in general, 
in no way could the discussions be viewed as comprehensive. 
This contrasts, for example, with 20 pages of text in Dohr, 
Inghram and Love (1935) and a full chapter on the subject in 
Jordan and Harris (1920). The overhead rate used throughout 
each modern text is based on a yearly budgeted number and 
linked to income measurement. Because the rate changes with 
different annual budget expectations, product costs cannot be 
compared from year to year. For the same reason, no variance 
provides information on capacity usage. 
It is impossible to pinpoint this change in focus since it was 
clearly evolutionary but this work attempts to trace some of the 
paths leaving to others the opportunity to research them further. 
At this point then, we return to the past to search for sources of 
these changes and to suggest reasons for them. 
THE SHIFT TO SALES EFFICIENCY— 
A TENTATIVE EXPLORATION 
The Great Depression 
What factors may account for the shift from operational to 
sales efficiency? During the depression of the 1930s, companies 
operated well under capacity for many years. Tracking idle ca-
pacity may have become superfluous. It was far more important 
to search for sales opportunities. 
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Fligstein (1990) noted this transformation although his re-
search interest was in methods of corporate control, not ac-
counting. He distinguished between the manufacturing and the 
sales and marketing conceptions of control exercised by large 
firms. The manufacturing conception (operational efficiency) 
was one corporate response to competition. 
(M)anagers embraced tactics to promote price stability. 
(They) viewed stable pricing as attainable through at-
tention to the production process. This caused them to 
focus on what they could control as a counterthreat: the 
flow of goods through the production process (117). 
In contrast, managers at other firms began early in the 
1920s to compete by searching for new markets, by differenti-
ating their products, by advertising and establishing brand 
names rather than by controlling production and prices. His 
thesis was that the firms that embraced the manufacturing 
conception did poorly, as a whole, during the depression while 
those that had shifted to a sales and marketing conception sur-
vived. While Fligstein (1990) looked primarily at competitive 
forces and the drive to eliminate or minimize competition, his 
ideas appear to be reflected in this cost literature. Accounting 
for efficiency might disappear if economic conditions made pro-
ductive efficiency irrelevant. That is, if products cannot be sold, 
there is little purpose in measuring whether machinery had 
been utilized to its fullest capabilities. 
A related factor that deserves extended study was the influ-
ence of trade associations. Under New Deal regulations, a trade 
associations was allowed to gather costing information from 
firms in its industry and establish industry-wide minimum prod-
uct costs. These minimums became floors below which firms in 
that industry could not reduce prices. The purpose was to elimi-
nate cutthroat competition and thereby minimize bankruptcies. 
Although not particularly successful, there may have been long-
term effects on cost structure (Galambos, 1966). Given this legal 
authority, there was an incentive to set product costs high 
enough to include idle capacity losses in order to ensure profit.15 
Also, if costs were set industry-wide, the incentive to continue to 
measure costs carefully was removed. 
15One can also imagine the incentive going the other direction. If the trade 
associations were dominated by the larger firms in an industry, they might want 
to set minimum costs low so that they could continue to charge low prices and 
force competitors out of business. 
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World War II and Government Regulation 
It is highly conjectural to draw conclusions about the long-
term effects of World War II regulations on cost accounting. 
However, it would not be appropriate to ignore possible effects 
for lack of solid evidence for there may well be links to the 
capacity issue. For the larger firm (and it is from relatively large 
firms that most of the contributions to the cost literature arise), 
the acquisit ion of government contracts meant the end of 
undercapacity for a sustained period of time. The government 
wanted output quickly no matter the cost. 
Most government contracts were on a cost plus a fixed fee 
basis. Nonreimbursable costs were spelled out. One of these was 
"expenses, maintenance, and depreciation of excess facilities va-
cated or abandoned, or not adaptable for future use in perform-
ing contract or subcontracts (including idle land and building, 
idle parts of a building and excess machinery and equipment)" 
(Miller, 1942, p. 98). It was not necessary to track and exclude 
the idle capacity costs of active facilities. Reimbursement was 
based on the contract, not the product, so the cost of individual 
products became irrelevant. With cost recovery and profit 
guaranteed, there was little or no incentive to be cost efficient. 
The issue is one of institutional memory. Did firms that operat-
ed with war contracts for many years return to measuring idle 
capacity after the war or was this measurement forgotten? 
Income Measurement—Direct Costing 
Direct costing was first introduced in the 1930s. From two 
articles in the NACA-Bulletin in the 1930s to over 40 in the 
1950s, it became a major topic in the accounting literature. Di-
rect costing treats all fixed overhead costs as period expenses, 
not as costs of inventory. The logic of marginal revenue or 
contribution margin analysis (unit sales price less unit direct 
cost) impressed many. Today it is covered in virtually all cost 
and managerial textbooks as a decision tool, but, at that time, 
many wanted to use it for inventory valuation as well. 
The 1953 NAA Research Series #23 on direct costing discov-
ered only 18 companies using this method in their financial 
records and both the Internal Revenue Service and professional 
accounting bodies were opposed to it on theoretical grounds. 
The 1957 revision of the 1948 "Accounting Concepts and Stan-
dards Underlying Corporate Financial S ta tements" by the 
American Accounting Association said that omitting any ele-
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ment of manufacturing cost from a product was unacceptable 
(539). Mssrs Hill and Vatter, in that publication, dissented from 
the majority view saying that direct costing was acceptable and 
"will, in many cases, yield results more useful to investors as 
well as to management" (545). For the purposes of this study, 
the important point is that while the information arising from a 
direct cost system is useful, it does not generate any data on idle 
capacity. Idle capacity was not an issue in that literature and 
that literature was pervasive for a long time. While direct cost-
ing was being discussed, productive efficiency was not. 
Income Measurement—the Matching Principle 
Perhaps the most important trend was the increasing inter-
est in the calculation of financial accounting income for report-
ing purposes. Prior to approximately 1938-1940, the balance 
sheet was not only the predominant published financial state-
ment, it was often the only financial statement. The components 
of income, such as 'Sales' and 'Cost of Sales,' had long been 
considered proprietary.16 Rather than an income statement there 
might have been a single line, called 'earnings,' or, perhaps 
'earnings before depreciation,' 'depreciation' and 'net earnings.' 
Often there was no reference to income at all. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission began to insist 
on sales and cost of sales disclosures and, despite the reserva-
tions of the business community and the accounting profession, 
income measurement quickly commanded attention. Theories of 
income measurement took on increased importance. Soon, one 
theory came to dominance in the financial community and it 
governed accounting for cost of goods sold and the valuation of 
ending inventory. It was the matching principle. 
Paton and Littleton's classic monograph, An Introduction of 
Corporate Accounting Standards (1940), made the matching 
principle, which linked economic benefits with economic sacri-
16A 1935 JOA editorial shows the profession's antipathy to disclosure. The 
following is in reference to new SEC requirements. 
Here it is provided that the profit and loss statement shall disclose the 
amount of gross sales, cost of sales and gross profits...If we were to have 
a full disclosure of every item of the accounts of a corporation engaged 
in competitive endeavor there soon would be no competition...(They 
object to the disclosure of confidential information because) it would be 
detrimental to the interest of investors and therefore contrary to the 
purpose of the law; and the information itself might be misleading (162-
163). 
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fices, preeminent. Sales were to be matched with the costs in-
curred to produce them. In order to match production with 
sales, the denominator volume of the overhead rate had to be 
based on sales. This matching process precluded any mea-
surement of idle capacity. Horngren's (1967, 1969) articles cited 
earlier are excellent examples of financial accounting's adoption 
of the matching principle. 
Ferrara (1960, 1961a&b) took the matching principle to the 
extreme. He argued that there was no such thing as an idle 
capacity loss for income measurement purposes. He proposed a 
unit of production method for allocating fixed costs, one that 
could not generate an idle capacity variance. He focused on 
financial income measurement—not on the operational needs of 
the firm. Ferrara wanted to match economic benefits (sales) 
with economic sacrifices (production costs) in order to produce 
the most theoretically correct measurement of income. 
Weinwurm (1961) responded heatedly to Ferrara (1961b). 
He argued that accounting had a duty to provide information, 
information that included data on capacity usage. Allowing 
theories of income measurement to dominate risked damaging 
company operations. Despite Weinwurm's arguments, income 
measurement played an increasingly large role in financial ac-
counting and had a substantial influence on cost accounting. 
This focus on income measurement had consequences. If 
idle capacity were not measured, it may well have been ignored. 
Indeed, there is virtually no literature on idle capacity after this 
until decades later. Just as Brummet (1957) accused early writ-
ers of ignoring different costs for different purposes, so too can 
those of the 1960s be accused—they were interested in income 
measurement to the exclusion of other accounting purposes. 
While supplementary records outside of the formal accounting 
records could provide information on capacity usage, the silence 
of the literature suggests that the topic was no longer of interest 
and that firms were not measuring it. 
The Disappearance of the Engineer 
The final component of the diminishing interest in opera-
tional efficiency may have been the gradual withdrawal of the 
industrial engineer from cost accounting venues. From 1900 -
1930, engineers maintained a presence in cost accounting. There 
was a substantial amount of contact among engineers and cost 
accoun tan t s interested in d isseminat ing cost informat ion 
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through conferences and articles. Many cost textbooks were co-
authored with engineers and engineers contributed regularly to 
the NACA-Bulletin and other publications of the National Asso-
ciation of Cost Accountants. 
The engineering contribution to the NACA-Bulletin declined 
from 20% in the 1920s to 13% in the 1930s and 7% in the 
1940s.17 Vangermeersch (1984) presented evidence of the decline 
of engineers in costing without offering any explanation for that 
decline. Armstrong (1985, p. 136) was interested in the power 
relationships between the accounting, engineering and person-
nel professions within the corporation. He took the disappear-
ance of the engineer as given and asserted that "accountants 
displaced engineers because decisions of allocation between dis-
similar operations could only be made on a common abstract— 
and therefore financial—basis." He contended that since man-
agement responds most strongly to financial information, in the 
long-term struggle for power, the accountant would displace the 
engineer. With the accounting profession focused on income 
measurement, and with their production-oriented colleagues 
gone, it is not illogical that production-oriented measures would 
fall by the wayside. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper was, in part, to remember those 
who measured operational efficiency earlier in the century. They 
accomplished this by spotlighting the idle time of machines and 
the idle capacity of the factory through a cost accounting system 
linked to production. Beginning in the 1930s, although interest 
in capacity never disappears entirely, there was a withdrawal 
from this topic. It was replaced by sales or marketing efficiency 
measures. Some of the possible reasons for this change were 
presented for future research. They included: the great depres-
sion, during which idle capacity was so prevalent that it hardly 
needed emphasis; the growth of trade associations which were 
given incentives to set price minimums; war contracts which 
reimbursed all costs and eliminated for many years the benefits 
of tracking idle capacity; an increasing interest in income 
measurement for financial accounting purposes which washed 
over management accounting and its literature; and the disap-
17This information was gathered by count. During these years, each article 
in the NACA-Bulletin was preceded by a short biography of the author which 
included his or her professional background. 
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pearance of the engineer from cost accounting which removed 
the party most interested in production. 
Except for selected references, no attempt has been made to 
study the capacity issue past the 1960s. By then, enough of a 
transition had been made from operational to sales efficiency to 
substantiate this major change. Much of the literature at that 
t ime was appear ing in The Accounting Review wri t ten by 
academics. Whether this academic influence might also have 
had a long-term effect on cost accounting practice is another 
topic for research. 
While idle capacity as an independent topic may not be 
overwhelmingly appealing to many readers, this research finds 
that it opens a window on periods of accounting history that 
have been insufficiently studied, particularly the 1930s and 
1940s. There was a major shift in the profession's understanding 
of overhead costing and the purpose of its allocations. That shift 
appears to have been generated by a variety of forces from 
within and without the profession. 
Losing idle capacity measurements meant that information 
on machine usage and production opportunities as well as the 
location of bottlenecks in the production process was lost. The 
modern attention placed on minimizing non-value adding activi-
ties has revived interest in capacity issues. It is possible that 
guidance on how to approach these problems might be found in 
the solutions posed by early cost accountants and their peers, 
the industrial engineers. 
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